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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to identify how behavior analysis and economics are complementary on the explanation of choice 
behavior, particularly intertemporal choices, through a literature review. Both behavior analysis and economics researchers 
have used mathematical models, usually exponential and hyperbolic formulations, to quantify intertemporal choice behavior. 
Considering theoretical aspects and characteristic models from each area, the present paper concludes that, despite 
differences in approach, exchange between findings from behavior analysis and economics can contribute to the integrated 
advance of scientific knowledge. 
Keywords: behavioral economics, choice behavior, intertemporal choice, quantification of choice. 
 
RESUMO 
Por intermédio de uma revisão da literatura da Análise do Comportamento e da Economia sobre comportamento de 
escolha, particularmente o de escolhas intertemporais, este artigo busca indicar a complementariedade das duas áreas de 
conhecimento na explicação de um objeto de estudo comum. Tanto a Análise do Comportamento quanto a Economia têm 
empregado modelos matemáticos, notadamente em formulações exponenciais e hiperbólicas, para mensurar o 
comportamento de escolha intertemporal. Partindo de aspectos teóricos e de modelos característicos de cada área, o presente 
artigo conclui que, a despeito de diferenças na abordagem, o compartilhamento recíproco dos achados da Análise do 
Comportamento e da Economia pode contribuir para o avanço integrado do conhecimento científico. 
Palavras-chave: economia comportamental, comportamento de escolha, escolhas intertemporais, quantificação de 
escolha. 
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In 2002, the Nobel Prize in Economics was 
awarded to psychologist Daniel Kahneman of Princeton 
University in recognition of his work on decision-making in 
situations with probability of gain or loss. Todorov, Coelho, 
and Hanna (2003) reported that researchers from different 
areas of psychology were "euphoric" with the award. They 
also emphasized the importance of the interaction between 
economics and psychology demonstrated from the economic 
analysis of decision making and the central role of 
psychological events in situations involving choice with 
conflicting alternatives. Indeed, Kahneman’s Nobel Prize 
clearly depicts two current tendencies of the scientific 
movement: the recognition of psychology and economics as 
complementary fields of study; and the emphasis on research 
on decision-making and choice. 
The growing rapprochement between psychology 
and economics can be exemplified by the publication, in 
1997, of a special edition of Oxford University's Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (the oldest English-language 
economic journal) entirely devoted to the overlapping field 
of behavioral economics. In addition, it is estimated that 
today 20% of graduate theses in economics at leading 
American universities (such as Harvard, MIT, Princeton, 
Yale, and Stanford) are related to that interdisciplinary field 
(Troyjo, 2007). In 2017, 15 years after Kahneman’s Nobel, 
the prestigious award once again goes to the field, crowning 
the economist Richard Thaler for his contributions to 
behavioral economics. 
As far as studies on decision-making and choice are 
concerned, research limits are currently quite broad, 
including different areas as economics, psychology, 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology, mathematics, and 
statistics. Iyengar (2010) points out, in this context, that the 
concept of "choice" can gain several meanings and its study 
can be conducted according to several different approaches. 
A considerable amount of research on decision making is 
dedicated to better understanding the so-called intertemporal 
choices, which involve the evaluation of costs and benefits 
occurring at different times. This type of choice is present in 
many situations of our daily lives. Loewenstein and Elster 
(1992) mention, for example, the choice between sleeping 
late or waking up early; snacking or eating a healthy meal; 
buying a sports car or a safe sedan; finding a job or attending 
college; risking pregnancy or using contraceptives. 
The psychological processes underlying 
intertemporal choice have been targeted by studies in both 
economics (e.g., Loewenstein & Elster, 1992) and behavior 
analysis (e.g., Logue, 1988; Rachlin, 1989). Applications 
resulting from research on intertemporal choice are 
numerous and varied. Meier and Sprenger (2007), for 
instance, used this tool to explain individual financial 
behavior (savings and consumption), expanding previous 
research on behavior patterns in the credit card market 
(Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman, 2007; Shui & Ausubel, 
2005). Schoenfelder and Hantula (2003) applied the 
concepts of intertemporal discounts to analyze the career 
choices of undergraduates. Different applications were used 
in the studies of Fehr and Zych (2000) and O'Donoghue and 
Rabin (2002), on the formation of habits and the 
development of addictive behaviors (Rachlin, 2000). 
Based on theoretical aspects and intertemporal 
choice models, this paper will attempt to demonstrate that, 
despite the different approaches of behavior analysis and 
economics (regarding the experimental subjects, the research 
design, the adopted scientific method, and the techniques 
applied to data analysis, for example), both areas are 
complementary. Consequently, sharing research findings in 
each field may contribute to the integrated advancement of 
scientific knowledge. 
 
Behavior Analysis Approach 
Choice is to respond to one stimulus among two or 
more available options and preference means spending more 
time responding to one stimulus (Skinner, 1950) or 
responding more frequently to one stimulus (Hanna, 1991). 
Decision making, choice between alternatives, and 
preference are behaviors that are constantly occurring 
(Todorov & Hanna, 2005). Even with simple reinforcement 
schedules, in which only one reinforcement contingency has 
been programmed, many concurrent responses, and their 
corresponding reinforcers, are possible beyond those 
planned by an experimenter (Herrnstein, 1961). 
For behavior analysis, choice behavior in itself does 
not say much: interest resides on the relations between 
organism and environment that characterize such behavior. 
In essence, it tries to comprehend where, when, and as a 
function of which variables are choice and preference altered 
(Todorov, 1982). 
Herrnstein (1961) was a pioneer in the investigation 
of the relation between distribution of behavior among 
alternatives and distribution of reinforcing stimuli. Based on 
these investigations, he formulated the Matching Law, which 
proposes that relative frequency of responding as well as 
relative time allocated to an alternative match the relative 
frequency of obtained reinforcers for that alternative: 
 
R1 / (R1 + R2)  =  S
R
1 / (S
R
1 + S
R
2)  (1) 
 
T1 / (T1 + T2) =  S
R
1 / (S
R
1 + S
R
2)  (2) 
 
in which R, T, and S
R
 refer to response frequency, allocated 
time, and obtained reinforcers, respectively, and the numbers 
indicate the choice alternatives. 
 Equations 1 and 2, proposed by Herrnstein (1961), 
gained much interest due to their applications to intermittent 
reinforcement conditions, when the reinforcing stimulus is 
presented occasionally and according to rules specified by 
the schedules of reinforcement (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). 
However, in some cases the distribution of 
responses does not match the distribution of obtained 
reinforcers (Todorov & Hanna, 2005). In fact, a decrease in 
behavior sensitivity has been observed: changes in the 
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distribution of obtained reinforcers were followed by smaller 
changes in the distribution of responses. This distortion 
usually happens due to specific problems of the 
experimental procedure, meaning that procedures may 
incorporate characteristics from natural settings and, 
therefore, point out the importance of the conditions in 
which choice occurs.  
Operant behavior experiments with pigeons will be 
taken for analysis. The subjects, before being exposed to the 
experimental conditions, are trained to eat at the feeder and 
peck keys in an operant chamber. This training involves 
some sort of response shaping technique and food is usually 
used as reinforcement (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950; Skinner, 
1953). During training, usually every peck is reinforced 
(continuous reinforcement schedule). In the first 
experimental session with concurrent variable interval 
schedules, in which responses are reinforced after different 
intervals of time have elapsed since the last reinforcer, 
pigeons tend to alternate frequently between keys when 
responses are not reinforced, since extinction generates 
behavioral variability (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950). Instead 
of independent and concurrent performance, a simple chain 
of behaviors occurs, and the reinforced sequence tends to be 
repeated. Once a chain of alternations, or changeovers, has 
been established, the animal simply no longer discriminates 
between alternative sources of reinforcement.  
To avoid this problem, Herrnstein (1961) 
programmed a changeover delay (COD) for alternating 
response patterns: no response would be reinforced before 
1.5 s had elapsed since the last changeover. The COD was 
created as a penalty for changing between schedules and to 
temporally separate responses emitted under one 
reinforcement schedule from those emitted under another. 
When a COD is at least 3 s long, or when there is another 
consequence for changeover responses that hinders 
formation of simple chains of behavior (cf. Baum, 1982; 
Boelens & Kop, 1983; Pliskoff & Fetterman, 1981; Todorov, 
1971; Todorov, Acuña-Santaella, & Falcón-Sanguinetti, 
1982; Todorov & Souza, 1978; Todorov, Souza, & Bori, 
1993), Equation 1 tends to describe well the relation 
between behavior and its consequences in concurrent 
variable interval schedules. Even so, Equation 1 has been 
considered inadequate to explain a fair amount of 
experimental results. To fit these data, Baum (1974, 1979; 
Baum & Rachlin, 1969) proposed an equation with 
additional parameters, known as the generalized matching 
law: 
 
R1 / R2  =  k (SR1 / SR2)
a
   (3) 
 
in which parameter k is a measure of bias, that is, of 
preference for an alternative, caused by variables other than 
reinforcer frequency (Cunha, 1988; Todorov & Bigonha, 
1982), and parameter a is a measure of behavioral sensitivity 
to the distribution of reinforcers among alternatives (e.g., 
Hanna, Blackman, & Todorov, 1992; Todorov, Oliveira-
Castro, Hanna, Bittencourt de Sá, & Barreto, 1983). 
 De Villiers e Herrnstein (1976) adapted the 
matching law equations to a single alternative setting (see 
also, de Villiers, 1977). This adaptation arises from 
Herrnstein’s (1970) already recognized principle that, even 
when only one alternative is programmed, response rate 
reflects a choice setting (e.g., between lever-pressing and 
scratching, sniffing or any other distraction; Gonçalves, 
2005; McDowell, 1988, 1989). The equation that reflects the 
frequency of behaviors when there is no more than one 
programmed alternative is 
 
R1 = k.S
R
1 / (S
R
1 + S
R
e)   (4) 
 
in which k corresponds to the asymptotic response rate in the 
absence of alternatives and S
R
e corresponds to the sum of 
every other reinforcer except those programmed (De 
Villiers, 1977; De Villiers & Herrnstein, 1976; Gonçalves, 
2005). 
In the interface between behavior analysis and 
economics, the Matching Law was theoretically placed 
within a context of theory of evolution (Logue, 1988) 
associated to rational behavior – that is, to maximizing 
behavior –, following the reasoning that organisms have a 
better chance of survival when maximizing, through a period 
of time, obtained reinforcers in a given situation (Rachlin, 
1989; Rachlin, Battalio, Kagel, & Green, 1981). 
To better explain maximizing, one must introduce 
the concept of substitutability, which indicates how much an 
individual is willing to trade one good for another. When 
goods are perfectly substitutable, the subject is indifferent 
between acquiring one, another, or any combination of both. 
The only dimension of interest is the total quantity of goods. 
When goods are not perfectly substitutable, the economic 
value of one can only be determined in relation to the other 
good for which it may be traded. The greater the availability 
of one good in relation to the other, the lower the subjective 
value of the acquisition of an additional unit of that good 
(i.e., the smaller the marginal value of the good). According 
to Rachlin (1989), if one considers the possibility of adding 
the value of two goods, a utility function that could express, 
for an individual, the total value of a basket of two goods is: 
 
VA  =  k1 (Q1)
s
 + k2 (Q2)
s
   (5) 
 
in which VA is the total value of a basket composed of 
quantity Q1 of good 1 plus quantity Q2 of good 2, k1 and k2 
are constants representing the contribution of each good to 
the total value, and the exponent s is a measure of 
substitutability between goods 1 and 2. Note that, if s is 
equal to 1.0, the goods are perfectly substitutable and the 
total value depends only on the weighted sum of the value of 
each good. If one had to choose only one of the items, the 
maximizing solution would be to simply choose the one 
available in greater amounts. However, if the items are not 
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perfectly substitutable (s < 1), choice depends not only on 
quantity but also on substitutability.  
Economic theory also predicts the existence of 
another equation that represents budget constraint of choice, 
based on the assumption that there is no infinite availability 
of goods. Maximization theory predicts that, given a 
possible set of alternatives represented by the restriction 
curve, choice will occur at the point in which subjective 
utility is maximal (see Figure 1).   
The relation between matching and maximizing is 
subject of much debate (e.g., Commons, Mazur, Nevin, & 
Rachlin, 1987): some believe maximizing only occurs in 
accordance to matching; others believe the opposite is true. 
As a matter of fact, in most cases, maximizing and matching 
make the same correct predictions of behavior. Rachlin 
(1989) approximates the utility function (Equation 5) to the 
equations used in behavior analysis by swapping variables 
A1 and A2, which indicate the availability of each good, with 
variables S
R
1 and S
R
2, which indicate frequency of 
reinforcement in period T: 
 
VA  =  k1 (S
R
1)
s
 + k2 (S
R
2)
s
   (6) 
 
In this case, note that exponent s from Equation 6 
corresponds to exponent a from the Generalized Matching 
Law (Equation 3), and that sensibility to the distribution of 
reinforcers corresponds to the substitutability measure. 
Specific experimental conditions, however, showed 
that organisms may not be able to maximize reinforcers but 
will match response distribution to distribution of obtained 
reinforcers (Herrnstein & Vaughan, 1980). Experimental data 
(e.g., Rodriguez & Logue, 1986; Schneider, 1973; Todorov, 
1973) has shown that organisms, in a choice situation, are 
more sensitive to variations in relative frequency of 
reinforcers than variations in relative magnitude or relative 
delay – a principle that was not foreseen by theories stating 
that individuals tend to distribute their responses to maximize 
available reinforcers (e.g., Logue, 1988; Rachlin et al., 1981; 
Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986). 
Thus, matching does not correspond perfectly to 
maximizing. Identifying maximizing using rationality, as is 
dear to economics, theoretically means that, in specific 
situations, individuals who match their choices are behaving 
quasi-rationally. Simon (1978) created the term “satisficing” 
for situation in which, considering time and information 
limitations, choice is suboptimal. An example of satisficing 
would be when individuals don’t count their change 
meticulously when given in coins. One would expect that such 
individuals will sometimes lose money. However, considering 
a wide temporal horizon, one may argue that the time and 
mental effort saved in not counting change compensates for 
financial loss. Thus, in the long-term, satisficing could also be 
considered an example of rational behavior. 
Rachlin (Rachlin, 1989; Rachlin, Green, & Tormey, 
1988) considers that the discussion of the preponderance 
between matching and maximizing is strictly conceptual, and 
depends only on how these terms are defined. If maximizing 
corresponds to a broad interval of time, then it will have 
difficulty predicting choice behavior. However, if maximizing 
simply means that choice behavior corresponds to the optimal 
option in an utility function that refers to a specific time 
interval, then such behavior can be correctly described as 
“rational”. Matching may be seen as a form of maximizing in 
a limited future, and as future events are more and more 
discounted, matching and maximizing tend to converge (for a 
comparison between molar and molecular views of choice 
theory, see Baum, 2004). Based on this understanding, 
Rachlin (1989) elaborated an interesting table (Table 1) 
showing the equivalence between economic and behavior 
analysis terminology: 
 
Table 1. 
Comparison of Terminology Used in Operant-Choice Experiments and in Economics (Rachlin, 1989). 
 Operant Choice Economic Choice 
Objective contingency Schedule of reinforcement Constraint 
Positive outcomes Rewards [reinforcers] Goods – Commodities 
Negative outcomes Punishers “Bads” - Commodities 
Symmetrical choice Concurrent schedules of reinforcement Allocation of budget between goods 
Asymmetrical choice Single schedule of reinforcement Allocation of time between work and leisure 
Subjective choice process Matching Maximizing 
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Figure 1. Maximization: choice between goods SR1 (x axis) and S
R
2 
(y axis), subjective utility curve, budget restriction curve, and 
maximization point. 
 
In the historical development of research on 
matching, the logarithmic transform of the matching 
equation enabled studying other parameters of reinforcing 
stimuli. The generalized matching law (Equation 4), in its 
logarithmic form, may be expressed as: 
 
log (R1 / R2)  =  log k + a log (S
R
1 / S
R
2) (7) 
 
Neuringer (1967) proposed an extension of 
Herrnstein’s (1961) original equation, in which frequency 
and magnitude – originally computed as duration of access 
to food –, of alternative reinforcers vary, using a simple 
multiplication rule to relate the distribution of responses to 
distribution of the combined effects of reinforcement 
frequency and duration: 
 
R1 / R2 = (S
R
1 . A1 / S
R
2 . A2)  (8) 
 
in which A is the duration of the reinforcing stimulus. Using 
the log transform of the Matching Law, Schneider (1973) 
and Todorov (1973) independently showed that, in choice 
situations where frequency and magnitude of reinforcing 
stimuli vary, frequency is more important than magnitude: 
 
log (R1 / R2)  =  log k + a log (S
R
1 / S
R
2) + b log (A1 / A2) (9) 
 
in which A is the exponent that measures behavioral 
sensitivity to changes in reinforcer magnitude in terms of 
duration of access to food for pigeons (Oscós & Todorov, 
1978; Todorov, 1973; Todorov, Hanna, & Bittencourt de Sá, 
1984) or number of food pellets for rats (Schneider, 1973). 
In the aforementioned experiments, the exponent in 
Equation 5 for frequency of reinforcement (a) was close to 
1.0 and the exponent for magnitude (b) was around 0.5. 
Besides magnitude and frequency of reinforcing 
stimuli, another parameter explored by the researchers was 
delayed reinforcement (cf. Azzi, Fix, Keller, & Rocha e 
Silva, 1964). In the natural environment, the consequence of 
a behavior does not always occur immediately after response 
emission. It is common for a certain time to elapse between 
de reinforced response and the presentation of the 
reinforcing stimulus (delayed reinforcement). Chung and 
Herrnstein (1967) studied the effects of delayed 
reinforcement in concurrent variable interval schedules and 
concluded that the matching principle also applied to his 
experimental data: 
 
R1 / R2 = [1 / (1 + D1)] / [1 / (1 + D2)] (10) 
 
in which D is the time of delay. Williams and Fantino (1978) 
analyzed data from Chung and Herrnstein (1967) using 
another equation in its logarithmic form: 
 
log (R1 / R2) = log k + c log (D2 / D1) (11) 
 
in which c is behavioral sensitivity to variations in delayed 
reinforcement. Williams and Fantion’s (1978) re-analysis 
showed that in Chung and Herrnstein’s (1967) experiment 
the value for c in Equation 11 was different between shorter 
and longer delays. Thus, c is a variable, not a constant that is 
independent of the absolute value of delayed reinforcement.  
The combination of frequency, magnitude, and 
delay of the reinforcing stimulus in the same equation with 
multiple variables has been used with satisfactory results. 
Logue, Peña-Correal, Rodriguez, and Kabela (1986) 
suggested the following equation, combining a larger 
number of variables: 
 
log (R1 / R2) = log k + a log (SR1 / SR2) + b log (A1 / A2) +  
c log (D2 / D1)      (12) 
 
Equation 12 is the broadest form of the Generalized 
Matching Law (Baum, 1979). When alternative schedules 
program reinforcers with the same duration and delay, 
Equation 12 is reduced to Equation 7. When only delays are 
equal, it is reduced to Equation 9. When magnitudes and 
frequencies are equal and delays different, Equation 12 is 
reduced to Equation 11. 
Rodriguez and Logue (1986) used another variation 
to manipulate the duration and delay of reinforcement 
values, maintaining reinforcer frequency equal and constant: 
 
log (R1 / R2) = log k + b log (A1 / A2) + c log (D2 / D1)  (13) 
 
With this equation, the authors found the value of 
0.5 for b and for c; these results were confirmed in a later 
experiment (Chavarro & Logue, 1988). 
The abundance of equations presented indicates the 
theoretical efforts devoted to capture all relevant variables in 
choice behavior in an empirically testable expression. A 
dimension that has shown to be particularly relevant in the 
understanding of the relation between reinforcement 
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frequency and response frequency is the delay of the 
delivery of reinforcement from the emission of a behavior. 
Situations involving delay, together with those in which 
reinforcement delivery is associated to a probability, have 
been named risky choice (Green & Myerson, 1996; Kacelnik 
& Bateson, 1996). Increasing delays or decreasing the 
probability of occurrence of an event decreases preference 
for such an event, that is, decreases its value for an organism 
– delayed or probabilistic events are discounted (Grace, 
1999). Discounting is intimately associated to the economic 
notion of individual discount rates (IDRs), that is, it 
measures how much a good loses its subjective value as a 
function of delay to its availability. 
In delayed reinforcement, the period between 
response emission and delivery of the consequence is one of 
the most studied variables influencing choice distribution in 
human and non-human animal studies. According to 
Gonçalves (2005, p. 16), “the effect of delay on choice 
originated a series of research that formed the body of what 
is mostly called, in behavior analysis, self-control” (our 
translation). 
Gonçalves’ (2005) statement, however, requires a 
short remark. Hanna and Todorov (2002) advise that many 
researchers have restricted the generality of the self-control 
phenomenon by overemphasizing the relation between self-
control and delayed reinforcement (Logue, 1988). This 
phenomenon, as the authors rightly express, is much 
broader. Skinner (1953, 1963, 1974, 1978) pointed out the 
importance of this topic, stating that individuals will often 
partially control their own behaviors when responding 
produces positive as well as negative reinforcement, that is, 
in situations of conflict. Thus, according to Skinner’s notion 
of self-control, this phenomenon is a contingency with two 
consequences (positive and negative reinforcement) for the 
same controlled response (Rc). Aversive properties are 
established for self-controlled behavior throughout 
individual history, and responses that reduce the probability 
of this behavior can be strengthened. A second, controlling 
behavior (Rsc), sometimes called commitment behavior 
(Rachlin & Green, 1972), is part of the contingency, altering 
the probability of a controlled response through changes 
produced in Rc controlling contingencies. Those changes 
may (a) reduce/increase intensity of eliciting or aversive 
stimuli; (b) produce/remove discriminative stimuli; (c) 
modulate motivation by creating establishing operations; (d) 
make reinforcers/punishers highly likely; or (e) develop 
behavioral alternatives that do not imply punishment. 
Skinner considers, thus, many types of self-control. It is 
important to emphasize that self-control is not an innate 
characteristic of individuals. According to Hanna and 
Ribeiro (2005, p. 175), “self-control is often related to 
personality traits, innate characteristics of individuals, or inner 
strength that enables control over one’s own actions. This use of 
the concept contrasts with the fact that the same person may 
present different degrees of self-control in different situations, 
and show differential degrees of self-control in similar 
situations, but in different stages of life” (our translation). 
The notion of self-control used by Gonçalves (2005), 
when referring to delayed reinforcement studies, is the one 
originally developed by Rachlin (1970, 1974, 1976, 1989) and 
by Rachlin and Green (1972). Two incompatible concurrent 
operants, R1 and R2, occur in the presence of different 
environmental conditions (S
D
1 and S
D
2), producing differential 
consequences (S
R
1 and S
R
2), with a delayed S
R
2: 
S
D
1 : R1  S
R
1 
S
D
2 : R2  S
R
2 (delayed) 
Since delay of the S
R
2 reduces its reinforcing value, 
the probability of R1 occurring is greater than R2. However, a 
Rsc can modify environmental conditions and invert the 
probabilities of occurrence of R1 and R2. Rachlin and his 
followers define self-control, in this model, as choice or 
preference for the alternative with a larger later reinforcer; 
choosing the smaller sooner reinforcer is referred to as 
impulsivity (Hanna & Todorov, 2002).  
 Rachlin and Green (1972) conducted the classical 
study on commitment responses, using a concurrent-chains 
schedule with pigeons. In this procedure, the initial link (FR 25, 
keys A and B) led to one of two possible responses, depending 
on the 25
th
 emitted response. One response to B led to the 
illumination of a key after time T, after which the response R2 
led to a 4-s blackout followed by 4 s of food. One response to A 
illuminated two keys after time T: response R1 led to 2 s of food 
followed by a 6-s blackout, and R2 produced the same result 
described for key B. Responses to B, thus, meant a commitment 
response, since only the delayed reinforcement situation 
becomes available. The authors observed that preference for 
key B increased as a function of time T. This result became 
known as the Ainslie-Rachlin Model: the subjective value of the 
reinforcer, that is, its efficacy (Ainslie, 1975), decreases as the 
moment of reinforcer delivery becomes more distant in time 
from the moment of choice. Thus, devaluing occurs, with less 
preference for the delayed reinforcer than for the immediate 
reinforcer – which, as we have already seen, is called utility 
discount of deferred goods. 
 The Ainslie-Rachlin Model represents the subjective 
value of reinforcers (x-axis in Figure 2) with hyperbolic curves 
as a function of time elapsed between emission of behavior and 
obtained reinforcer (y-axis). The value curves for the 
sooner/smaller and the larger/later reinforcers cross at a certain 
point (delay value). After this point, the subjective value of the 
smaller/sooner reinforcer becomes greater than the value of the 
larger/later reinforcer, producing an inversion, or change, in 
preference. At exactly this point, choice between both 
reinforcers is indifferent, so called the indifference point (see 
Figure 2). 
F. C. BETTARELLO & E. S. HANNA 
59 
 
Figure 2. Ainslie-Rachlin model: curves of subjective value of 
smaller sooner reinforcer and larger later reinforcer as a function of 
time, and indifference point. 
 
When there are different indifference points for 
different reinforcer magnitudes, it is possible to graph an 
indifference curve representing the intertemporal 
value/discount behavior for a given individual. 
The Ainslie-Rachlin Model was expanded for 
situations involving changes in magnitude and delay of 
aversive stimuli by Deluty, Whitehouse, Mellitz, and 
Hineline (1983). In their experiment, reinforcement was 
substituted by shocks. In an initial period of 5 s, the 
commitment period, a response led to the presentation of a 
variable T followed by a 5-s delay and 0.5 s of shock. If 
there were no responses during the commitment period, a 
choice period occurred after T, during which one response 
immediately led to 0.5 s of shock and absence of responses 
led to a 5-s delay followed by 5 s of shock. The authors 
expected a symmetrically opposite behavior to that occurring 
in the appetitive situation, with preference for the delayed 
alternative as a function of increase in delay. The results 
corroborated this hypothesis. 
In an attempt to develop a mathematical model to 
predict influence of delay on the subjective value of 
reinforcers, Mazur (1987) developed a different procedure 
from Rachlin and Green’s (1972). While Rachlin and 
Green’s study required choice between a commitment 
alternative and an alternative that led to a new choice 
between both alternatives, in Mazur’s experiment choice 
occurred for alternatives with different delay values. This 
was called adjustment procedure or titration schedule. 
In this first titration procedure, pigeons were 
exposed to a contingency requiring an initial response that 
activated two keys, A and B (Mazur, 1987).  Responses to A 
were followed by a fixed delay and 2 s of access to grain. 
Responses to B led to an adjustable delay and 6 s of grain. 
Each experimental session was divided into 16 blocks of 4 
trials. In each block, the first two trials were forced choice, 
one trial in which only key A was illuminated and available 
for pecking, and another trial in which only key B was 
illuminated and available. In the other two trials, both keys 
were illuminated and choice was free. Responses on free 
trials determined the adjustment of the larger reinforcer: two 
responses on A decreased the delay by 1 s in the block that 
followed; two responses on B increased the delay by 1 s; one 
response on each key maintained the delay. 
Note that, with this procedure, Mazur (1987) 
determined the indifference points, that is, points in which 
the value of the delayed reinforcer was equivalent to the 
value of the immediate reinforcer, represented by a similar 
distribution of responses among both keys. Throughout the 
experiment, delays from 0 to 20 s were programmed. An 
indifference point was determined for each delay, from 
which Mazur evaluated goodness-of-fit of different 
mathematical values for the relation between the value of a 
reinforcer and its delay. 
 The first model presented by Mazur (1987) was the 
exponential model, in which the reinforcer value is inversely 
proportional to the delay, in a constant negatively 
accelerated function: 
 
V = Ae
-KD
    (14) 
 
in which V is the value or strength of a reinforcer made 
available after delay D, A represents the value of the 
reinforcer when made available immediately, K is a 
parameter representing individual differences that determine 
how fast V declined with increases in delay, and e is the base 
of a natural logarithm. 
The second model presented by Mazur (1987) was 
the hyperbolic model, in which the value of the reinforcer is 
also inversely proportional to delay, yet according to a 
negatively decreasing acceleration function (reduction in 
subjective value is initially steep and, as delays increase, 
gradually becomes less steep): 
 
V = A / (1 + KD)    (15) 
 
Finally, Mazur (1987) introduced the hyperbolic-
exponential model, in which a parameter S is added to 
represent individual variation in the evaluation of the delays: 
 
V = A / (1 + KD
S
)   (16) 
 
Results obtained by Mazur (1987) favored the 
hyperbolic model, which fitted well the empirical data. The 
hyperbolic-exponential model was not discarded, but adding 
a free parameter, which hinders its interpretation and is less 
parsimonious, led the author to choose the hyperbolic model 
as the most adequate.   
Mazur (2006) analyzed some peculiarities of 
choosing an exponential or hyperbolic model. The author 
states that economists – specifically classic economists, as 
will be referred to in this paper– favored the exponential 
equation as an adequate representation of intertemporal 
discounting since it is apparently more “rational”: all the 
reinforcers are discounted by the same percentage as time 
passes, independently of magnitude or moment of delivery 
(that is, IDR is constant). However, as discussed by 
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Ainslie (1975), if the discounting parameter K (see 
Equations 14 and 15) is the same for two reinforcers, the 
immediate and the delayed, the exponential equation does 
not allow for inversion of preference in a delayed choice 
situation: a person preferring a larger/later reinforcer today 
must maintain this preference with the passage of time. 
However, in specific cases, when K is greater for the smaller 
than for the larger reinforcer, the exponential equation can 
predict inversions in preference (Green e Myerson, 1993). 
The hyperbolic equation, on the other hand, predicts 
inversion of preference independently of the values set for 
parameter K (as in the cases, according to Mazur, in which a 
person who is dieting promises not to get a second serving 
for lunch, but changes their mind during the meal and eats 
more than planned). 
Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) tested the 
exponential model’s assumption that IDR is constant for 
different delays. To do so, they employed an experimental 
procedure previously used by Coller and Williams (1999), 
the multiple price list (MPL). The MPL presents 15 choice 
binomials between a smaller reinforcer that will be made 
available in a proximal future date and a larger reinforcer 
that will be made available on a later date. A different IDR is 
associated to each choice binomial. Harrison et al. applied 
the MPL to four different delays: 6, 12, 24, and 36 months. 
To control for the presentation of multiple delays 
affecting participants’ responses, two experimental settings 
were put in place: in one, participants were randomly 
distributed to a session in which they should consider only 
one delay; in the other, each participant went through 
sessions that included all four delays. The authors used 
questionnaires to collect data on participants’ socio-
demographic characteristics, financial instruments available 
to each participant, the annual interest rate for each of these 
instruments, their current bank balance and individual 
perception of their possibility of taking on loans, their line of 
credit, and credit card balance. Correlations were found 
between some socio-demographic characteristics and 
participants’ IDRs (level of education, professional 
condition – student, retired, employed, or unemployed –, 
years after midlife, perception of access to financial 
instruments).  
Harrison, Lau, and Williams’ (2002) research 
showed there is a significant difference between the IDR 
determined for a 6-month delay and IDRs for the other 
delays, contradicting the exponential model and 
corroborating the behavior of the discount rates from the 
hyperbolic model. 
After Mazur (1987) developed and used 
explanatory mathematical models of the relation between 
reinforcer value and delay in animal studies, a procedure that 
became known as delay discounting (DD) was designed for 
studies with humans. In this procedure, either the 
smaller/sooner reinforcer or the larger/later reinforcer is 
fixed and the other reinforcer varies. The goal is to find the 
pair of values for which the subject is indifferent between 
choosing one reinforcer or the other. This pair is identified 
when the subject reverses their preference from one 
reinforcer to the other, i.e. the switching point. The 
switching point must be located between the two pairs of 
alternatives in which reversal occurs. Considering the 
differences in magnitude between the smaller sooner and the 
larger later reinforcers on the switching point, it is possible 
to check the individual discounting rate for a specific delay. 
Once the switching points are identified for each 
delay, it is possible to plot an indifference curve that 
represents an individual’s intertemporal choice behavior. 
Following Mazur’s (1987) rationale, this curve allows us to 
adjust mathematical equations and evaluate which is a better 
descriptor of the relation between delay, magnitude, and 
subjective value of the alternatives presented to human 
participants (Green, Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen, & Fry, 
1996; McKerchar, Green, Myerson, Pickford, Hill, & Stout, 
2009; Myerson & Green, 1995). The exponential and 
hyperbolic models have been tested empirically quite 
frequently (Gonçalves, 2005). 
 Myerson, Green, and Warusawitharana (2001) 
suggested an alternative method to measure discounting of a 
delayed reinforcer, the area under the curve (AUC). 
According to these authors, this method does not depend on 
the mathematical shape of the discounting function and 
overcomes occasional problems related to the statistics 
properties of the function’s parameters. The AUC is simply 
the area found under the empirical discount function 
normalized in a Cartesian plane. 
One must also note that behavior analysis has 
sought to formalize the effects of delay beyond simple 
reinforcement schedules, with experiments using only 
concurrent-chains schedules. A concurrent-chains schedule 
typically involves two schedules in effect during the initial 
links, each occasionally leading to their own terminal link. 
Each terminal link has its own reinforcement schedule that 
finally leads to a primary reinforcer. 
Fantino (1981; Fantino, Preston, & Dunn, 1993) 
formulated a delay-reduction theory (DRT) according to 
which the value of the conditioned reinforcer in a terminal 
link in a concurrent-chains schedule is determined by how 
much a delay is reduced when each terminal link initiates, 
compared to the mean time for feed presentation before the 
initial links are in effect. Squires and Fantino (1971) 
formulated the following equation for DRT: 
 
R1 / R2 = (S
R
1 / S
R
2) (Ttotal – Tt1 / Ttotal – Tt2)  (17) 
 
in which S
R
1 and S
R
2 are the total reinforcer frequencies, 
including time of the initial link as well as the terminal link, 
Ttotal is the total mean time to primary reinforcer since the 
start of the initial links, and Tt1 and Tt2 are the mean times to 
primary reinforcer from the beginning of the terminal links, 
that is, mean durations of both terminal links. The DRT has 
Matching Law as a basic assumption, and reduces to 
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Herrnstein’s (1961) Matching Law when there are no 
terminal links. 
Grace (1994) developed the contextual choice 
model (CCM), based on the following equation: 
 
R1 / R2 = (S
R
i1 / S
R
i2) (S
R
t1 / S
R
t2) 
(Ti / Tt)
 (18) 
 
in which R1 and R2 are the response frequencies in the initial 
links of a concurrent-chains schedule, S
R
i1 and S
R
i2 are the 
reinforcement frequencies in the initial links, that is, the 
frequencies of the onset of each one of the terminal links, 
and S
R
t1 and S
R
t2 are the reinforcement frequencies in both 
terminal links (frequencies in which terminal links deliver 
the primary reinforcer). According to the CCM, choice in 
concurrent-chains schedules depends on the schedules in the 
initial links inasmuch as the schedules in the terminal links. 
The CCM is characterized by the Tt/Ti ratio, in which Tt is 
the mean duration of the terminal links and Ti is the mean 
duration of the initial links. Since the Tt/Ti ratio is the 
exponent of the reinforcement rates in the terminal links, the 
CCM suggests that differences in the terminal links will 
have greater effects on preference when they are long in 
relation to the duration of the initial links, and that the 
terminal links will have lesser effects on preference when 
they are relatively short. 
Grace (1994) derived the CCM from Herrnstein’s 
(1961) basic assumption from the Matching Law: the 
relative frequency of behavior is proportional to the relative 
frequency of reinforcement. Grace assumed that terminal 
link schedules are conditioned reinforcers with values as a 
function of their reinforcement frequencies (S
R
t1 and S
R
t2). 
Besides the Matching Law, Grace also took from Baum and 
Rachlin’s (1969) proposal that when reinforcers differ in two 
or more dimensions (e.g., frequency, delay, magnitude), 
these factors may be combined multiplicatively to obtain a 
measure of total reinforcer value. Similarly, Grace argued 
that reinforcement frequencies in the initial links (S
R
i1 and 
S
R
i2) may be multiplied by the reinforcement frequencies in 
the terminal links (S
R
t1 and S
R
t2) to obtain the values of both 
alternative schedules in a concurrent-chains procedure. 
Grace (1994) interpreted that the behavioral 
expression of the values in the terminal links depends on the 
context in which they are presented (that is, the durations of 
the terminal links compared to those of the initial links). 
Following Baum’s (1974) work on the Generalized 
Matching Law, which has an exponent reflecting behavioral 
sensitivity to differences in reinforcement rates (parameter a 
in Equation 3), Grace used the Tt/Ti exponent to express the 
fact that sensitivity to reinforcement rates in terminal links 
depends on the relative durations of the initial and terminal 
links. The final result of this set of assumptions was the 
CCM. Note that Equation 18 is reduced to the simple 
Matching Law in cases where there is no terminal link (Tt 
= 0). 
As well as the assumption on the crucial role of 
delayed reduction, the DRT differs from the CCM in its 
assumption that choice behavior is also a function of total 
reinforcement frequencies (S
R
1 and S
R
2), compared to the 
CCM’s assumption that it is a function of the 
reinforcement frequencies of the initial links (S
R
i1 and 
S
R
i2) (Mazur, 2006). 
 Mazur (2001) constructed, for concurrent-chains 
schedules, the hyperbolic value-added (HVA) model, 
based on three fundamental assumptions: first, as the 
CCM and the DRT, the HVA adopts the Matching 
Principle as a basic assumption, reducing to the Matching 
Law when there are no terminal links; second, the model 
considers that reinforcer value declines with increases in 
delay according to a hyperbolic function; third, it predicts 
that choice depends on increases produced by the value of 
the conditioned reinforcer, i.e., environmental changes 
that signal the end of initial link and the beginning of a 
terminal final. It is noteworthy that Davison (1988) had 
already adapted the hyperbolic model to concurrent-
chains schedules with relative success, but with 
procedural specificities that compromised generalization. 
The equation for HVA is: 
 
R1 / R2 = (S
R
i1 / S
R
i2) (Vt1 – Vi / Vt2 – Vi) (19) 
 
The two expressions to the left are identical to the CCM. 
The expression in the parenthesis to the right includes Vt1 
and Vt2, the values of the terminal links, and Vi, the value 
of the initial links. All these values are calculated through 
a variation of the hyperbolic function (Mazur, 1984). 
Empirically, all three models have shown to be 
adequate predictors of choice behavior. In a comparison 
conducted by Mazur (2001, 2006), the CCM explained on 
average 90.8% of the behavioral variability of many non-
human animal subjects in concurrent-chains schedules, 
the HVA explained 89.6%, and the DRT 83.0%. 
However, the theoretical differences between models 
must be pointed out. For the CCM, the key factor is the 
context in which choice is made, more specifically the 
duration of the time period for choosing. If time for 
choosing is long in relation to the duration of the terminal 
links, differences between the schedules in the terminal 
links will exert relatively little influence on preference. 
For the DRT, the key factor is delay reduction: preference 
depends on decreasing time for the reinforcer, which is 
signaled by the start of a terminal link. Finally, the HVA 
considers the value of the conditioned reinforcer 
associated to each schedule as the key variable, and 
preference depends on increases in the value that is 
signaled by the start of a terminal link. 
Economic Approach 
It is worth analyzing, after the exposition of the 
models used by behavior analysis to describe intertemporal 
choice behavior, the formalizations used by economics with 
the same purpose, which are mainly models of discounted 
utility. Economics, as well as behavior analysis, gives great 
prominence to the study of intertemporal choice. According 
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to Loewenstein (1992), four distinct historical stages can be 
identified in the evolution of the economic interpretation of 
intertemporal choice. 
In the first stage, nineteenth-century economists 
like Senior (1836) and Jevons (1871) explained 
intertemporal discounting using what today would be called 
"motivational effects", that is, emotional or hedonistic 
influences on behavior. Both authors mentioned that the 
predisposition to temporarily defer gratification would 
depend on the emotions immediately felt by decision-
makers. 
In the second stage, marked by the contributions of 
Böhm-Bawerk (1889, 1914) and Fisher (1930) at the turn of 
the nineteenth century to the twentieth, intertemporal choice 
was viewed in cognitive terms as an exchange of present 
satisfaction for future satisfaction. The reason for the 
existence of a discount would be the inability of the 
decision-maker to accurately imagine in the present what the 
future would look like. 
The third stage begins with Samuelson’s (1937) 
formulation of the discounted utility model (DU). 
Samuelson proposes an equation in which individuals 
discount future costs and benefits exponentially. A possible 
utility function that would contemplate the exponential 
paradigm of choice would be: 
 
     T-t 
U = ut + Σδ
i
ut+i    (20) 
   
i=1 
 
This function relates total utility (U) according to the 
discounted utility (u) of activities present in period (t) and of 
future activities in the periods from t + 1 to T-1. Each 
individual would present a constant discount factor (δ) for 
any two periods, i.e., discounts would be the same for 
immediate choice and for future choice. The individual 
discount factor (IDF), as an indicator of the time preference 
of individuals, is inversely proportional to the individual 
discount rate (IDR), so that: 
 
IDF  =  1 / (1 + IDR)    (21) 
 
Samuelson’s model (1937) considers that 
individuals decide between saving and spending in a 
perfectly rational way, given their income constraints. 
According to this view, there is a strong preference for the 
maintenance of a pattern of constant consumption 
throughout their life cycles (Deaton, 1992). Saving and 
spending decisions are made in a way that ensures smooth 
intertemporal spending, given income differences at 
different times. These choices, considering diverse 
individual preferences, are optimal. 
 The fourth historical stage pointed out by 
Loewenstein (1992) supersedes the classical model of 
discounted utility, with the proposition of alternative models 
that consider the possibility of deviations from perfectly 
rational behavior. This reaction to the classical model was 
based on empirical observation. It was found that individual 
choices hardly fit the exponential function proposed by 
Samuelson. First, consumption is not smooth over a 
particular individual's life, but tends to keep up with income 
variations at different stages of their life cycle (Carroll & 
Summers, 1991). The greater the current income of an 
individual, the greater are their immediate expenses, the 
opposite also being valid. Even in a shorter time span, 
individuals fail to smooth their consumption. Beneficiaries 
of social security programs consume more at the beginning 
of each month and significantly less at the end of the benefit 
period (Shapiro, 2005; Stephens, 2003). Regular employees 
likewise convey evidence of heavy spending after receiving 
their monthly payment, whilst decreasing their level of 
consumption by the end of the month (Huffman & 
Barenstein, 2004). Finally, the expectation of predictable 
revenue (such as tax refunds or bonuses for performance at 
work) also directly affects spending patterns (Ishikawa & 
Ueda, 1984; Souleles, 1999). The logical conclusion derived 
from all these empirical investigations is that individuals do 
not choose between saving and spending/consuming in a 
perfectly rational way, i.e., they do not optimize their 
smoothing consumption, spending a great deal and saving 
little in certain periods, and saving a lot and barely spending 
in other periods. 
Countless papers have sought to demonstrate that 
the distortion in the optimization of choice between saving 
and spending is caused by self-control problems (Benton, 
Meier, & Sprenger, 2007; Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman, 
2003; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). When planning future 
choices, individuals optimize their decisions in order to 
smooth their consumption, but when the same individuals 
are faced with a present and immediate choice between 
saving and spending, the relative value of consumption 
increases as the relative value of saving decreases. Hence 
most individuals choose the immediate reinforcement of 
spending, even when the optimal long-term decision would 
be to save (delayed reinforcement). 
As a result of such evidence, research has 
concluded that, contrary to the traditional economic view of 
temporal preferences, many individuals do not discount 
costs and benefits exponentially, but present a bias towards 
the present (see, for example, Shane, Loewenstein, & 
O'Donoghue, 2002; Takahashi, 2005). Additionally, 
evidence suggests that individuals differ substantially as to 
the degree of their bias to the present (Coller, Harrison, & 
Rutström, 2005). Temporal preferences biased to the present 
represent a dynamic inconsistency of choice because it 
implies that an individual imposes a lower discount factor 
between now and a future date than between an equal period 
in the future, similarly to Mazur's critique (2006) of the 
exponential model. 
Differential discounts lead to a problem of self-
control (Meier & Sprenger, 2007). Individuals may make 
plans for choices in future periods, but they will 
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systematically violate these plans by the time these future 
choices become present (Fisher, 1930; Strotz, 1956). The 
exponential utility function, elaborated under the premise of 
optimization of consumption smoothing, is not, therefore, 
representative of innumerable situations in which individuals 
act inconsistently. Laibson (1997) and O'Donoghue and 
Rabin (1999) present an alternative quasi-hyperbolic 
function that accounts for the differential discounts: 
 
      T-t 
U = ut + βΣδ
i
ut+i     (22) 
    
i=1 
 
In the quasi-hyperbolic model, β represents bias to 
the present, while δ represents the long-term discount factor. 
An individual discounts βδ between today and tomorrow, 
but only deducts between two sequential days in the future at 
δ. The quasi-hyperbolic model therefore covers cases of 
dynamic inconsistency in the choices between saving and 
spending. If β < 1, individual choice presents dynamic 
inconsistencies (the present value of consumption is 
overestimated). If β = 1, individuals discount exponentially 
and the quasi-hyperbolic model narrows down to the 
standard model of exponential discounts. In this case, 
choices are perfectly rational and optimal in the long run. 
Thus, β is also an indicator of the degree of 
rationality underlying individual decision-making and self-
control. The perfectly rational Homo economicus (β = 1) 
would be able to optimize and maintain his financial 
planning even when choices become present. In the case of 
the other economic agents, there would be a bias to the 
present (β < 1) and choice would present dynamic 
inconsistency. The occurrence of dynamic inconsistencies 
creates the methodological need to apply to research on 
delay, whenever possible, not an immediate and a delayed 
reinforcer, but rather two delayed reinforcers, one made 
available in the near future and another in a more distant 
future. This procedure, known as front-end delay, aims to 
neutralize the variation of IDR as a result of bias to the 
present. 
 
Final remarks 
One may note there are some differences between 
the kind of approach that behavior analysis and economics 
give to their research. For example, while behavior analysis 
has a large body of research using non-human animals, 
economics research is conducted almost exclusively with 
human participants. The use of non-human subjects by 
behavior analysis is justified by a concern to maintain 
rigorous experimental control, a difficult task when 
participants are human. Experimental control is critical to 
ensure that data regarding individual behavior (often 
collected in studies with small n) leads to consistent analysis 
and results. Economics, roughly speaking, works with 
greater flexibility in experimental control, compensated by 
the joint analysis of data from a large number of participants 
(large n). 
The way in which data is collected also differs in 
each field: behavior analysis uses adjustment procedures, 
such as titration; economics, for the most part, employs 
questionnaires. The experimental design is usually different: 
behavior analysis uses the subject as its own control (within-
subject design); economics usually employs group designs. 
Another difference concerns the scientific method that is 
applied: behavior analysis prioritizes the inductive method, 
whilst economics favors the deductive method. 
Options regarding type of design and method 
influence the way each area analyzes obtained data. 
Behavior analysis prioritizes analyses that highlight each 
subject in an attempt to understand individual differences. In 
this context, it uses instruments such as visual inspection and 
(mainly descriptive) statistical analyses and regressions that 
focus on the individual. Economics, on the other hand, 
prioritizes the understanding of the group’s representative 
relations, with intensive use of econometric techniques and 
inferential statistics. 
These distinctions help explain why behavior 
analysis and economics have followed different courses for 
such a long time, with few opportunities for dialogue. The 
use of distinct vocabulary by scientists from each area, even 
when dealing with similar issues, hinders interaction. 
Integration of both fields of knowledge is also hampered by 
the fact that, in the clear majority of cases, the dissemination 
of research results from each area is limited to its own verbal 
community. 
Despite such setbacks, however, it is of utmost 
importance to promote the interface between behavior 
analysis and economics, insofar as this article has conveyed 
that information generated by one field of knowledge may 
complement information obtained in the other. As discussed 
above, research on decision-making and choice in general 
and on intertemporal choice in particular are examples of 
how behavioral and economic approaches are synergistic. 
Keeping their peculiarities, both behavior analysis and 
economics have employed mathematical models, notably in 
exponential and hyperbolic form, in order to measure 
intertemporal choice behavior. 
Integrating results, enabled by the use of the 
experimental method in both behavior analysis and 
economics, is not, however, a trivial task. Each of these 
fields of knowledge generally adopts a distinct stance in 
explaining and discussing its results. Behavior analysis 
considers a direct relationship between choice behavior and 
the environment. Risk aversion, for instance, is seen as a 
facet of choice in conflicting situations (self-control) that 
occurs in certain contexts. Economics, on the other hand, 
generally takes a mediation-type stance (which brings it 
even closer to cognitive approaches in psychology). 
Discussion of results in economics thus stems from such a 
position: in the example of risk aversion, economics 
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understands that this is a self-control problem, consequently 
making self-control the cause of choice behavior. 
Overcoming these obstacles (including the 
eminently epistemological ones) is of paramount importance 
to allow the findings of one area to be incorporated into the 
research of the other towards the integrated advancement of 
scientific knowledge. 
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